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The reported rise in radicalism among youth in Pakistan since 9/11/2001 has been attributed to 
religious education in madrasas and schools. However, education in Pakistan is only part of the 
historical and contemporary forces that contribute to the prevailing exclusivist religio-political 
discourse. Although most policy papers have recommended a secularization of public education, 
such efforts by the Pakistani government have been counterproductive. These efforts by the 
Pakistani government to reshape education, with massive funding from international donors, 
have faced strong opposition and there are signs of psychological reactance as evidenced by even 
greater levels of religious radicalism among Pakistani youth. The current study suggests a viable 
alternative for reshaping education in Pakistan. A nationwide survey of educated urban youth (N 
= 386) conducted by the first author, revealed that when considering radical religious, Western 
secular and liberal religious ideas, Pakistani youth were overwhelmingly supportive of a liberal 
religious approach to education that highlights an inclusive Islam emphasizing freedom and 
compassion. Findings have implications for government reforms, peace education initiatives, and 
long-term conflict transformation in Pakistan. 
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De-radicalizing Pakistani society: The receptivity of youth to a liberal religious worldview 
 
Education reform in Pakistan has been a key concern for US security policy since 9/11. In 
order to counter the spread of radical ideas that fuel militancy, the US government, USAID and 
other donor agencies have invested millions of dollars to reform and secularize Pakistan’s 
education system (Hathaway, 2005). But despite substantial investment, subsequent research has 
indicated growth in the popularity of radical ideas amongst educated Pakistani youth (Siddiqa, 
2010; Yusuf, 2008). . The current study is based on the premise that educated Pakistani youth 
tend to adopt radical ideas primarily because these ideas are conflated with religion. International 
donor agencies’ recommendations to secularize education do little to mitigate this perception of 
youth. Furthermore, the current research will offer evidence for the proposition that religion-
based radical ideas can be effectively countered by introducing religion-based liberal ideas in 
education. It tests the hypothesis that given a choice, Pakistani youth will prefer liberal religious 
ideas in education over Western secular and radical religious ideas. Accordingly, we argue that 
liberal religious ideas should be used to reform education in Pakistan in order to mitigate the 
effect of confrontational radical ideas. 
The article begins with a historical overview of the persisting debate in Pakistan on the 
role of religion in education. It then elaborates how radicalism has been defined by various 
authors especially in Pakistani context. The study then proceeds to advance the argument in 
favour of religion-based liberal ideas as a means of countering religion-based radicalism in 
Pakistan and building peace. 
Historical Context: Religion and Education in Pakistan 
Movement toward the creation of Pakistan originated in the late 19th century, a time when 
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a vigorous debate was taking place among Muslim scholars seeking to explain the decline of 
Muslim power in and outside India. Muslim reformers like Syed Ahmed, Shibli Nomani, 
Mahmud al-Hasan and Iqbal argued for the need to restore Muslim dignity. Most scholars felt the 
need to rethink, revive and restructure their religious ideas, practice and identity (Rahman, 1982; 
Zaman, 2012; Mc Cloud, Hibbard, & Saud, 2013). 
An important element of the debate was the role of education in religious revival and 
reform. The establishment of institutions like Darul Uloom Deoband, Nadwatul Ulama and 
Aligarh University demonstrated a strong recognition among Muslims of the key role education 
could play in the restoration of their faith in changing times. At its birth, Pakistan inherited this 
debate; thus, the role of religion in education has remained a central question in the country. 
The First Education Conference in Pakistan was held in November 1947, right after 
independence while the country was struggling to deal with the aftermath of a violent partition. 
But other than passing resolutions favouring an Islamic orientation in education and emphasizing 
the need to inculcate moral ideals through education, this conference did not achieve much in 
terms of subsequent action (Rahman, 1982, pp. 110-112). Rahman (1982) contends that while it 
is clear that the leaders of Pakistan at the time of its inception ‘wanted to inform their 
educational system with an Islamic orientation, this Islamic orientation, in their eyes, was not 
only tolerant but positively liberal’ (p. 111).Yet after almost seven decades of 
independence, the resolve of the First Education Conference, to have an educational system, 
inspired by a liberal Islamic ideology (as cited by Nayyar & Salim, 2003) remains an unfulfilled 
agenda. 
Some Pakistani governments tried to address the issue of religion and education. In 
1960s, the Ayub Khan regime made efforts to upgrade madrasas, the traditional institutes for 
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religious learning. He founded an ulama academy to expose madrasa educators to modern ideas 
and wider social issues. An Islamic university was set up in Bahawalpur and most importantly an 
Islamic Research Institute was formed to study and interpret religion for modern times. The 
Institute was built with the twin mission of bridging the gap between traditional madrasas and 
modern scientific scholarship, and reorienting the Westernized mind-set of modern educated 
Muslims towards their religious tradition (Rahman, 1982). However, the Institute became a 
victim of reactionary Islamist forces that failed to comprehend its scholarly work, doubted its 
intentions, viewed it as inspired by a Western liberal agenda and rendered the institute 
ineffective through protests and demonstrations that effectively mobilized the opposition. And 
here a theme is set for the future of Pakistani education. 
The breakup of Pakistan in 1971 was a turning point in country’s history when it had to 
reinvent its national identity from scratch (Kumar, 2001).Religion again played a key role in 
identity formation. The New Education Policy introduced in 1972 by the Bhutto regime was 
informed by a religio-ideological discourse (Datoo, 2014; Nayyar & Salim, 2003), but according 
to Rahman (1982), religion was again used as an empty slogan rather than a genuine guideline 
for education. Owing to a trust deficit between modernist ruling elite and traditionalist ulama, no 
sincere effort was made to clarify the role of religion in education or to advance religious 
scholarship in Pakistan (p. 114). 
Growing radicalism 
The ideological discourse in Pakistan remained dominated by debates among liberal 
modernists, traditional Islamists and radical Islamists until the 1980s, when new regional and 
domestic developments strengthened the influence of the radical Islamist position. The radical 
discourse emphasized a professed ideological confrontation between Islam and other systems of 
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the 20th century, namely, Communism and Capitalism. The policy discourse identifies radicalism 
as: …youth perceptions/responses on religiosity, their exclusionary thinking, religious 
intolerance, a level of sympathy for – or at least lack of active opposition to – Islamist violence 
among pockets, an ‘us versus them’ conception of the world, and frustration with the conditions 
in the country … (Yusuf, 2014; p. 9). 
Some key regional and domestic developments in and around Pakistan since the1980s 
contributed to the growth of radical ideas in the country. The 1979 Iranian revolution escalated 
the sectarian divide as Sunni-Shia rift in the Middle East shifted to Pakistan, the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and resulting US funding for Islamist jihad in Afghanistan fuelled Islamist 
militancy, and a military regime seeking legitimacy through ‘Islamization from above’ resulted 
in politicizing the religious sentiment of the common man. A climate was thus created in which 
religious radicalism, militancy and sectarianism thrived (Haider, 2011; Hussain, 2009). In 
addition, the military regime began to promote an exclusivist religious discourse in education for 
political gain (Hussain, Salim, & Naveed, 2011, p. 15; Nayyar & Salim, 2003), an endeavour that 
had a profound impact on subsequent generations. 
The trend continued to grow the radical Islamist position during 1990s, escalated by a 
number of events: internal political instability, an economic recession, the US withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, new US sanctions on Pakistan over nuclear issue, the continuation of civil war in 
Afghanistan, rise of the Taliban, insurgency in Kashmir, the US led war in the Gulf, the post-
cold war rhetoric of ‘New World Order’ and promotion of ‘Clash of Civilizations’ narrative. As 
the Saudi-Iranian rivalry persisted, Pakistan experienced an expansion of Saudi funded Salafi 
madrasas which greatly contributed to the spread of radical worldviews especially among the 
urban, educated affluent class (Ahmad, 2009; Haider, 2011; Waseem, 2011). 
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And then came 9/11/2001, demanding from Pakistan, an immediate reversal of the 
radicalization process which was active since 1980s. The 9/11 Commission Report highlighted 
the link between international terrorist networks and Pakistan’s religious seminaries - madrasas. 
The dismal state of Pakistan’s public education sector was also identified as a root cause of 
militancy and a potential threat for US security (Hathaway, 2005; Winthrop and Graff, 2010). 
Faced with international pressure to de-radicalize Pakistan, President Musharraf introduced yet 
another slogan of ‘enlightened moderation.’ Much was done in a hasty manner under this new 
slogan: militant organizations were banned, foreign militants were captured, madrasas were 
raided and aided to meet the Western demand for madrasa reform, and school curricula were 
examined for revision. But all these efforts were inconsequential and did not change much on the 
ground (Haider, 2011, p. 125). Instead, hostile reactions were elicited from various groups in 
Pakistan that perceived these efforts as a Western conspiracy against Islam (Kronstadt, 2004, p. 
6). In effect, the top down approach to bring ‘enlightened moderation’ to Pakistan proved 
counterproductive. Radicalization continued to multiply especially among the young, now fed by 
the local and global ‘war on terror’ discourse. 
The result was a radicalized generation, raised during the war on terror years, fiercely 
attached to religious beliefs which are at the core of their identity, and suspicious of the ‘other,’ 
be it another sect, religion, or ‘the West’ (Basit & Rathore, 2010; Fair & Shapiro, 2010; Khan, 
2013; Sial & Anjum, 2010; Siddiqa, 2010; Waseem, 2011).  
What we mean by radicalization 
Radicalism remains a contested term in academic literature. A number of academic and 
policy papers have conceptualized radicalism in different ways. Yusuf (2014) has made an effort 
to synthesize multiple meanings of radicalism in a single definition quoted earlier in the text. 
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Radicalization, according to Schmid (2013), is not only a social psychological scientific concept 
but also a political construct, introduced and popularized in recent years by academic debates on 
national security. Schmid (2013, p. 18) defines radicalization as follows:  
An individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of 
political polarization, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance 
between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one 
or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in 
confrontational tactics of conflict-waging…  
 
Siddiqa (2010) sets apart radicalism from religiosity, conservatism and militancy. She 
defines radicalism as ‘the tendency to be exclusive instead of inclusive vis-à-vis other 
communities on the basis of religious belief’ (p. 25). Such radicalism may not be manifest in 
behaviour, but can lead to militancy in its extreme form; Siddiqa describes this attitude as ‘latent’ 
or ‘passive’ radicalism. Generally, radicalism exists as a worldview or an attitude in which the 
individual develops a bias against ‘the religious other.’ Drawing on the ideas of Yusuf, Schmid 
and Siddiqa, the current study defines radicalism as: a tendency to endorse rigid, exclusivist and 
confrontational ideas especially against the perceived threats to religious identity. In the current 
article, the term extremism is used interchangeably to convey a similar meaning. 
Radicalism, especially religion-based radicalism among the youth, has been on the rise in 
Pakistan especially since 9/11 (Basit & Rathore, 2010; Haque, 2014; Khan, 2013; Noor, 2009; 
Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009; Saigol, 2010; Sial & Anjum, 2010; Siddiqa, 2010; Yusuf, 
2008). Schmid (2014) and Khan (2013) explain how narratives are constructed by extremist 
organizations to win public support for their cause. Radical narratives draw upon deeply 
embedded cultural narratives to appeal to emotions and values of the target audience. In the case 
of Pakistan the extremists’ propaganda has been particularly effective as they have successfully 
exploited the ‘narratives related to political, social and historical conditions of Pakistan’s birth’ 
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(Khan 2013, p. 2). They generate emotional resonance because they are aligned with people’s 
fears, desires and hopes. 
Widespread radicalism provides an enabling environment for ideologically motivated 
terrorism and prevents consensus building against acts of terror (Calfas, 2014; Khan, 2013; 
Haque, 2014; “Religio-Political Discourse in Pakistan Too Narrow and Dissonant to Curb 
Radicalization in Pakistan,” 2012). General John Allen, former commander of US-NATO forces 
in Afghanistan describes this phenomenon in the following words, ‘The growth of extremism, 
terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan is one of the most alarming developments in the past 10 
years in that particular region. It could possibly be the most alarming development globally’ 
(Calfas, 2014, p. 1). 
Radicalism in Pakistan has been linked to religion (Haider, 2011; Mufti, 2012; Saigol, 
2010), religious education (9/11 Commission Report, 2004; Coulson, 2004; Haqqani, 2002; 
Rahman, 2004; Singer, 2002) and public education in the country (Bajoria, 2010; Fair & Shapiro, 
2009; Hathaway, 2005; Hussain, Salim, & Naveed, 2011; Kronstadt, 2004; Nayya r& Salim, 
2003; Winthrop & Graff, 2010). Madrasas, Pakistan’s traditional religious seminaries became the 
immediate cause of concern for policy makers and academics after 9/11. Termed ‘incubators for 
violent extremism’ (9/11 Commission Report 2004, p. 367), ‘Islam’s Medieval Outposts’ 
(Haqqani, 2002), ‘factories of jihad’ (Sareen, 2005), ‘weapons of mass instruction’ (Coulson, 
2004), Pakistani madrasas remained at the centre of academic and policy debate post 9/11. Later 
the fear of madrasas was viewed as largely exaggerated and instead, the need to focus on 
Pakistan’s public education was highlighted (Andrabi, Das, & Khawaja, 2009; Bergen &Panday, 
2006; Fair, 2008; Kronstadt, 2004; Winthrop & Graff, 2010). Attention was drawn to the 
alarming state of the structure (Khan & Yusuf, 2011; Winthrop & Graff, 2010) and content of 
10 
 
public education (Haider, 2011; Hathaway, 2005; Hussain, Salim, & Naveed, 2009), which 
demanded immediate attention. The absence of good public education and good civic education 
was identified as a major factor that contributes to the growth of radicalism in Pakistan. 
Policy recommendations to resolve the problem of radicalism in Pakistan post 9/11 
included financial assistance to reform religious and public education in Pakistan. It was 
suggested that madrasas be monitored by the government, and modern, secular disciplines should 
be introduced in madrasa curricula (Singer, 2002, p. 7; Kean and Hamilton, 2004). Musharraf 
regime’s efforts to curb extremism and introduce a policy of ‘enlightened moderation,’ which 
paid special attention to education sector reform, was highly encouraged and generously 
supported (9/11 Commission Report 2004, p. 369). During this time, the education sector in 
Pakistan received a substantial amount of funding from the US government (i.e., a five year $100 
million US Pakistan agreement was signed in Aug 2002). About $300 million of additional funds 
for education were allocated to USAID from 2005-09 (Report for Congress on Education 
Reform in Pakistan, 2005, p. 123). The ‘mainstreaming of madrasa’ (i.e. inclusion of secular 
subjects in their curriculum) and ‘a critical review of the entire education curriculum from grade 
one through ten’ were the top most goals of reform plan (Report for Congress on Education 
Reform in Pakistan, 2005, p. 134). But despite heavy funding the impact of this reform effort 
remained limited. Little progress was made on the ground. In fact these efforts turned out to be 
counterproductive as they met strong opposition from madrasas and the general public 
(Kronstadt, 2004). 
Religion remains an important force in Pakistan and it provides power to the radical 
narratives (Basit & Rathore, 2010; Haider, 2011; Fair & Shapiro, 2010; Sial & Anjum, 2010; 
Siddiqa, 2010). Fair and Shapiro (2010) present the results of polling data obtained in 2009 
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showing nearly 70% Pakistanis wanted sharia to play a larger role in Pakistan’s law. 
Importantly, most people equated sharia with good governance. Sial and Anjum (2010) report 
that most people in Pakistan do not like religious extremism and militancy. But their religious 
ideas are greatly influenced by the state led ideological discourse and the assertions of religious 
clerics. Therefore, they look to these same sources of authority namely the state and the religious 
clergy to transform their disliking for extremism into an open rejection of it. It is also reported 
that one of the main reasons for Pakistanis’ resistance to post 9/11 madrasa and public education 
reform is the perception of foreign intervention in their religious teaching and their extreme 
sensitivity to this matter (Kronstadt, 2004, p. 6). 
 
The failure of post 9/11 education reform effort in Pakistan demands a re-examination of 
the underlying assumptions. In particular, the assumption that Pakistani youth may be de-
radicalized by introducing liberal secular ideas in education has proven erroneous. Pakistanis 
seem unwilling to accept such changes in their school and madrasa curriculums especially when 
they are demanded from outside. In fact such efforts tend to be taken as confirmation of the 
prevailing conspiracy theories generating fears of being controlled by others.  
Potential glimmers of hope  
Based on close observations of Pakistani students’ political views in classrooms during 
post 9/11 years, 1 it is our contention that the imposition of a foreign secular tradition can result 
in ‘reactive radicalism’ by which we mean the tendency of individuals and collectives to adopt a 
stronger radical identity when there is the perception that powerful but subtle forces are 
attempting to influence the nature of their Islamic identity. The sources of these subtle forces 
                                                 
1The lead author has been teaching ‘Social Studies’, ‘Political Science’ and ‘International Relations’ courses in 
Pakistani schools and universities for more than a decade.  
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could be efforts by members of another religion, a different sect, country, culture or civilization 
(e.g. the notion of ‘the West’ and ‘the Western civilization’). Reactive radicalism may even 
occur in response to someone from one’s own faith that is perceived as an ‘agent of the other,’ as 
in the case of Malala Yusufzai2 in Pakistan.  
A number of studies suggest alternatives to secularization in the interest of de-
radicalization. In keeping with the enduring influence of religion in Pakistan and the centrality of 
religion to Pakistani identity, it has been suggested that religious ideas may be used for de-
radicalization in Pakistan (Ahmad, 2011; Candland, 2005; Khan, 2013; Siddiqa, 2010). In 
particular, many scholars have argued for the construction of an alternative religious discourse, 
closer to the liberal, enlightened Islamic vision of the founders of Pakistan, to counter the 
prevailing radical discourse (Ahmad, 2011; Candland, 2005; Huda, 2010). The current study 
builds on the arguments advanced by earlier studies and examines whether educated Pakistani 
youth are likely to be receptive to such an approach. The findings have implications for the kind 
of educational approach and national narrative that could counter radicalism. 
The assumption that radicalism is caused by a lack of education, socio economic factors, 
poor governance and corruption (Noor, 2009; Winthrop & Graff, 2010; Yusuf, 2008) has been 
roundly criticized by Siddiqa (2010, pp. 6-12) who finds traces of radicalism even among youth 
from financially secure backgrounds studying in elite universities of Pakistan. Radicalism among 
this group, apparently is not affected by the grievances of the marginalized and instead, has been 
attributed to the growing influence of religious based organizations working in urban areas of 
                                                 
2 Malala Yousafzai is a young Pakistani activist for female education, who was shot by radical religious militants in 
2012, when she was on her way to school. She however recovered from the injury, continued her campaign for 
female education and managed to receive worldwide recognition for her work including Nobel Peace Prize in 2014. 




Pakistan since 1990s and the ‘growing consciousness’ of being ‘targeted’ and ‘ostracized’ by the 
West since 9/11 (pp. 81-82).  
Our expectation is that given a choice between radical religious, Western secular and 
liberal religious ideas, youth in Pakistan will prefer liberal religious ideas. The reason for this 
expectation is twofold: First, as we have suggested, Pakistani youth exhibit psychological 
reactance when presented with a secular curriculum, a condition in which they more fervently 
turn toward more radicalized ideas. Second, research suggests that Pakistani youth favour 
education based on religion but reject militant views of religion (Sial & Anjum, 2010; Siddiqa, 
2010). 
Method 
Since the study is linked to Pakistan’s education system, especially the religious content 
of the national curriculum, it seeks the opinion of educated, middle class, urban youth of 
Pakistan, as this particular class is the main recipient of public education. The study examines 
the responses of youth to three sets of ideas. The first set, labelled ‘radical religious ideas,’ 
represents a confrontational worldview; it includes ideas frequently projected in the extremist 
discourse. The second set, labelled ‘Western secular ideas,’ emphasizes tolerance for diverse 
religions; it includes ideas frequently presented in the Western academic and policy discourse as 
recommendations to counter radicalism in Pakistan. The third set, labelled ‘liberal religious 
ideas,’ is consistent with the views of Islamic scholars and most people who identify themselves 
as Muslims. In this third set, the notions of justice and equality are emphasized and many of the 
ideas are clearly recognized as coming from the two main religious sources in Islam: Quran and 
Hadith, the latter of which refers to the sayings or practice of the Prophet. For example, items 
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such as ‘no compulsion in religion’ and ‘female education’ are direct quotes from the Quran and 
Hadith text. 
Participants 
A total of 386 (70% male) participants completed the survey from across 7 regions of 
Pakistan. Of those who reported a religion, all were Muslim (5 did not select any religion). The 
ages ranged from 16 to 30 years old, with the majority being within traditional college ages: 45% 
were 16 to 20 years old, 41% were 21 to 25 years old, and 14% were 26 to 30 years old. 
Measures 
 Radical religious ideas. Eight items were used to assess the degree to which young 
people in Pakistan support radical ideas which tend to be dualistic and confrontational. This set 
of ideas was collected from popular radical discourse. It represents inclinations toward a rigid 
and confrontational worldview perceived to be linked to religion owing to its association with a 
fixed religious identity. Possible responses were on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Sample items included the ‘United States is the root 
cause of all the troubles in Pakistan’ and ‘I want Pakistan to become an Islamic Superpower that 
dominates the world.’ Higher scores indicated more support for religious radical ideas. The 
internal consistency of this scale was acceptable (α = .73).  
 Western secular ideas. The degree to which participants endorsed Western, secular ideas 
around education was assessed with an 8-item scale. This set of ideas was collected from 
recommendations that appeared in the Western policy papers to reshape education for de-
radicalization of the youth in Pakistan. It represents inclination toward a Western secular position 
which advocates religious neutrality and/or equal space for all religions. The scale included items 
such as ‘In addition to Islamic Studies, Pakistani school curriculums should also include other 
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faiths such as Hinduism, Christianity, Buddhism etc.’ and ‘Pakistani schools should teach respect 
for religions other than Islam.’ Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale the degree to 
which they 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). As with the previous scale, higher scores 
indicated greater support, in this case for Western secular ideas; the internal consistency for this 
scale was α= .63. 
 Liberal religious ideas. The third construct, support for liberal religious ideas, was 
assessed using 13 items. This set of ideas was collected from authentic Islamic religious text and 
tradition. It represents an inclination toward an tolerant and inclusive worldview based in 
religion. Participants could respond on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) to the extent they supported items such as ‘Protection, respect and equal 
treatment to minorities is closest to the Islamic spirit’ and ‘Female education is ordered by the 
Quran.’ This scale had acceptable internal consistency (α= .78) and higher scores signified 
greater support for liberal religious ideas. 
Results 
All means, standard deviations, ranges and bivariate correlations are reported in Table 1. 
Gender did not relate to any of the constructs of interest. Age, however, was negatively 
correlated with support for radical religious ideas (r = -.13, p< .05); that is, older youth were less 
likely to support radical ideas compared to younger participants. At the same time, overall 
support for radical religious(r = .18, p< .01) and Western secular ideas (r = .35, p< .01) were 
both significantly and positively related to liberal religious ideas. 
To test our hypothesis that youth in Pakistan are more receptive to liberal religious ideas 
as compared to radical religious or Western secular ideas, a series of paired t-tests were 
conducted in SPSS 21. Paired t-tests were selected because of the dependent nature of the data; 
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that is, all participants responded to all scales (Figure 1). The use of this approach allowed for 
the direct comparison of endorsement between the three types of ideas that might inform 
education policy in Pakistan. However, a condition of the paired t-test is that all measures must 
be on the same scale. Therefore, prior to the running the comparisons, each of the measures were 
transformed by dividing the total by the number of items, giving each a range from 1 to 5 with 
comparable means. 
Analyses for the first pair of variables, radical religious and Western secular, revealed 
there is more support for radical religious ideas, compared to Western secular ideas (t = 6.44, 
p<.001). That is, the mean differences between the two scales (radical religious: M = 3.87, SD = 
.72 vs. Western secular: M = 3.53, SD = .70) suggests there was slightly more support for radical 
religious ideas within this sample. 
The second analysis compared support for radical religious ideas vs. liberal religious 
ideas among Pakistani youth. It revealed that there was significantly more support for liberal 
religious compared to radical religious ideas (t = -15.01, p< .001). That is, the mean differences 
between the two scales (radical religious: M = 3.87, SD = .72 vs. liberal religious: M = 4.47, SD 
= .47) were significantly different. Examining the third pair of variables indicated there was 
significantly more support (t = -26.50, p< .001) for liberal religious (M = 4.47, SD = .47) 
compared to Western secular ideas (M = 3.53, SD = .70). It should be noted that the mean for 
liberal religious ideas was quite high, indicating that on average youth strongly agreed with this 
approach to education.  
Discussion 
The results support the hypothesis that given a choice between radical religious, Western 
secular and liberal religious ideas, Pakistani youth prefer liberal religious ideas. This finding 
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implies that unlike prior claims, youth in Pakistan are not most attracted to radical ideas. In fact, 
youth are willing to embrace liberal ideas if they are embedded in religion. For example, 
although radical religious views were favoured over Western secular views, given a third option, 
Pakistani youth in this sample clearly preferred a set of liberal religious ideas more than the other 
two views. 
Sial and Anjum’s (2010) analysis points towards a possible explanation of our findings. 
They claim that most people in Pakistan do not like religious extremism but their religious ideas 
are shaped by the state led ideological discourse and assertions of the clerics. Moreover, they 
look towards these same sources of authority to reject extremism but such a counter-narrative by 
state and religious clergy is not forthcoming.  
Although the prevailing discourse and narrative in Pakistan conflates religion with radical 
ideas, the current study suggests that it is religion which is important for Pakistanis and not 
radical extremism. In addition, the results of the current study are consistent with the proposition 
that efforts to push a secular agenda on Pakistanis may result in ‘psychological reactance’ or a 
condition in which a more radicalized identity is adopted. Coulson (2004), for example, states 
that the central goal of USAID’s education operations in Pakistan was to improve public schools 
‘to draw children away from madrasas’ (p. 19). As a result, large amounts of funding were made 
available for Pakistan’s ‘Education Sector Reforms.’ The report notes, however, that the ‘only 
significant result’ of this policy was to motivate previously factionalized madrasas ‘to unite 
under a single umbrella organization’ (p. 5). Such interventions were clearly counterproductive. 
In the present study, radical religious and Western secular ideas were negatively correlated; 




The results of the current study are also consistent with findings of Siddiqa’s (2010) 
survey research that queried the attitudes of educated Pakistani youth towards religion. Most 
youth identified themselves as believers, considered religion their primary identity, considered 
religion very important in their lives and think it is right to have Islam as the basis of a system of 
governance. Most youth also consider Al Qaida a terrorist outfit and want government to ban all 
jihadi outfits. 
These findings comport with the current study’s thesis that educated Pakistani youth are 
attached to religion but not radical extremism. But, it appears youth, for a variety of reasons, 
conflate being religious with being radical. As noted in previous studies (Khan, 2013; Nayyar & 
Salim, 2003; Sial & Anjum, 2010; Siddiqa, 2010), the religious ideas of the young in Pakistan 
are largely shaped by prevailing radical discourse and exclusivist ideas in education, be it 
madrasa or public education, and strengthened by War on Terror experience. 
Only a few previous studies recognize the importance of de-radicalization through 
religion in Pakistan. Strategically such an approach would not only be readily accepted by 
Pakistani youth, as indicated by the current study, it would also counter radical elements in 
society that are opposed to de-radicalization efforts, as has happened in the past. 
Although many earlier studies rightly suggest investment in education (Hathaway, 2005; 
Winthrop & Graff, 2010; Yusuf, 2011) and revision of curricula (Hussain, Salim, & Naveed, 
2011; Haider, 2011), this alone might not be sufficient to de-radicalize Pakistani youth. Instead, 
an effective de-radicalization strategy should aim to connect to the religious sentiment in 
Pakistan and disconnect religion from radical ideology propagated by militant groups. 
An additional implication of the current research is that the construction of ‘the 
alternative national narrative’ to counter religious extremism in the country, as suggested by 
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Pakistan’s National Internal Security Policy (2014-18), should be based on liberal religious ideas 
rather than secular ideas. Competent religious scholars must be taken on board along with other 
stakeholders to negotiate a narrative based on mutual respect. 
The study’s findings have wider and deeper implications for peace building efforts 
outside Pakistan as well. In a world greatly shaped by Islam vs. the West narrative, and troubled 
by Islamist militancy in shape of Al Qaeda, Boko Haram and ISIS, the voices bringing attention 
to liberal, compassionate discourse within Islamic tradition become extremely important. 
Education in the Muslim world needs to highlight key religious ideas that promote universal 
human values and are intentionally ignored by radical religious narratives. Religious education in 
and outside Pakistan may benefit from the ideas of a multitude of contemporary Muslim scholars 
highlighting the liberal discourse within Islamic tradition. The following voices are only a few 
among them. 
Fazlur Rahman considered the traditionalist educational system of the ulama as one of 
the most neglected areas of educational reform, owing to its resistance to change and adaptation 
to cultural and intellectual modernity. As a result religious leaders produced by this system are 
unable to fulfil socially relevant functions or provide guidance to the modern educated class 
(Rahman, 1999, pp. 6-7). Admiring the sophisticated intellectual tradition that ulama inherited, 
Fazlur Rahman laments that vital aspects of this tradition, namely ‘critical thought’ and 
‘innovation’ have been abandoned by ulama. If traditional Islamic intellectual legacy is revived 
in its original spirit, it would inform social movements in the Muslim world that had an ethical 
and activist agenda (Rahman, 1999). 
In an article published in Daily Express special edition on Iqbal Day (Nov, 9, 2014), 
Javed Iqbal, a noted intellectual and son of Pakistan’s national poet Iqbal, wrote about the work 
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that Iqbal left incomplete. He mentions ‘The origins and evolution of Ijtehad (independent 
reasoning in Islam)’ and ‘The Quranic Concept of a Welfare State’ as two projects Iqbal had 
wanted to complete but could not during his lifetime. Javed Iqbal urged institutions built in 
Iqbal’s name to undertake these incomplete projects and propagate Iqbal’s liberal religious 
thought for the benefit of the masses. 
At the heart of the radical Islamist narrative lays the idea of an Islamic state. An Naim 
(2009) presents a convincing religious argument to counter this idea based on the clear Quranic 
message that ‘there is no compulsion in religion’ (Quran, 2:256), An Naim asserts that  
in order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice, which is the only way one 
can be a Muslim, I need a.... state that does not claim or pretend to enforce sharia 
(the religious law of Islam)...simply because compliance of sharia cannot be 
coerced by fear of state institutions or faked to appease their officials (An Naim, 
2009, p. 1). 
 
An Naim argues that in order to let Muslims live by their own belief in Islam as a matter 
of religious obligation, the state should not attempt to enforce sharia because the coercive 
enforcement of sharia is against the basic principles of Islam, that is, ‘there is no religious merit 
in forced compliance’ (p. 290). At the same time An Naim points out the necessity of negotiating 
sharia among Muslims to make it more relevant to their lives. He contends that sharia for 
Muslims ‘should be a source of liberation and self-realization, not a heavy burden of oppressive 
restriction and harsh punishments’ (p. 290). 
Although the current research was designed to focus on policy issues and underscored the 
value of liberal, compassionate Islam, future research could be aimed at the development of 
theory with particular attention to hypotheses that explore some of the reasons why Pakistani 
youth are receptive to various kinds of curricula. In addition, the current study raises a number of 
other questions, some of which include: What are the barriers to adopting a liberal religious 
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perspective in the popular discourse of Pakistan? What factors could promote the growth of 
intellectual liberal Islam in Pakistan? In what ways would the dominant Pakistani narrative be 
altered by the growth of liberal Islam? Who would be threatened by movement toward a liberal 
form of Islam? How could we test whether such an approach would promote a less violent 
society? In what ways would liberal Islam contribute to human well-being? We leave these 
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Figure 1. Comparison of transformed means for the degree of support for radical religious, 
Western secular and liberal religious ideas among Pakistani youth (N=386). 
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